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Abstract—In this paper we introduce Password Authenticated
Keyword Search (PAKS), a cryptographic scheme where any user
can use a single human-memorizable password to outsource
encrypted data with associated keywords to a group of servers
and later retrieve this data through the encrypted keyword search
procedure. PAKS ensures that only the legitimate user who knows
the initially registered password can perform outsourcing and re-
trieval of the encrypted data. In particular, PAKS guarantees that
no single server can mount an offline attack on the user’s pass-
word or learn any information about the encrypted keywords.
The concept behind PAKS protocols extends previous concepts
behind searchable encryption by removing the requirement on
the client to store high-entropy keys, thus making the protocol
device-agnostic on the user side. In this paper we model three
security requirements for PAKS schemes (indistinguishability
against chosen keyword attacks, authentication and consistency)
and propose an efficient direct construction in a two-server
setting those security we prove in the standard model under the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our efficiency comparison
shows that the proposed scheme is practical and offers high
performance in relation to computations and communications
on the user side.
I. INTRODUCTION
Searchable encryption. Using protocols for Searchable
Encryption [1]–[4] clients with limited computing and storage
resources can outsource encrypted data to a server or a
collection of servers, perform search over the encrypted data
(typically using encrypted keywords) and eventually retrieve
searched data while preserving its privacy against the servers.
Existing searchable encryption schemes can be broadly split
into those where the keyword search procedure requires either
high-entropy shared keys such as Symmetric Searchable En-
cryption (SSE) schemes from [3], [5], [6] or a private-public
key pair such as Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search
(PEKS) schemes from [1], [2], [6]–[10] on the user side.
In practice, the requirement to maintain high-entropy keys
on the user side results in less flexibility when it comes to the
use of multiple, different devices for outsourcing and retrieval
of data. The user is effectively prevented from using different
devices unless the private key is made available to every such
device.
Password Authenticated Keyword Search (PAKS). The
idea of basing searchable encryption solely on passwords,
proposed in this paper, helps to avoid costly and risky key
management on the user side and enables the whole process
to be device-agnostic. This, however, comes with challenges
considering that both passwords and keywords typically have
low entropy. Amongst the core security properties of PAKS
there is a need to guarantee that only the legitimate user,
who knows the password, can outsource, search and retrieve
data. Hence, basing security of searchable encryption schemes
on passwords introduces the need for a distributed server
environment where trust is spread across at least two non-
colluding servers, as is also the case in many password-based
protocols for authentication and secret sharing, e.g. [11]–[19].
While a more general secret sharing architecture with t-out-
of-n servers would be applicable as well, the use of two
servers can be seen as the most practical scenario and the
minimum requirement to achieve protection against offline
dictionary attacks. The use of two servers is required not only
to protect passwords but also to prevent keyword guessing
attacks, like those demonstrated in [10] for (public key-based)
PEKS schemes.
We model PAKS as a cryptographic scheme where users
can register their passwords with the servers and then re-use
these passwords for multiple sessions of the outsource and
retrieval protocols. In each outsource session the user can
outsource encrypted keywords along with some (encrypted)
document to both servers. The retrieval protocol realises the
search procedure based on the keyword that the user inputs
to the protocol and provides the user with all documents
associated with that keyword allowing the user to also verify
the integrity of the retrieved documents. We define security
of the PAKS scheme using BPR-like models [20], [21] that
have been widely used for password-based protocols. We
define privacy of PAKS keywords through indistinguishability
against chosen keyword attacks (IND-CKA) while considering
active adversaries, possibly in control of at most one server,
who can also register own passwords in the system. While
IND-CKA security protects against the adversary who does
not know the password from successfully retrieving outsourced
data, we additionally require authentication to protect the
outsourcing operation itself, thus preventing the adversary
from outsourcing data on behalf of the user; this requirement
must also hold even if the adversary controls one of the
servers. Our third PAKS requirement, consistency, akin to [1],
ensures the correctness of the retrieval process, in particular
prevents cases where one keyword is used to outsource data
that can then be retrieved using a different keyword.
Our direct PAKS construction follows conceptually the
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following more general approach that combines ideas behind
Password Authenticated Secret Sharing (PASS) [11]–[17] and
SSE [3], [5], [6]. In the registration phase, the user picks a
password pi and a high-entropy symmetric key K that will
be used to encrypt keywords and secret-shares K protected
with pi across both servers. In order to outsource keywords the
user engages into the PASS reconstruction protocol to obtain
K and then into the SSE outsource protocol to outsource
the keywords. In order to search for keywords and retrieve
data the user again reconstructs K using PASS and performs
the keyword search using SSE. We stress however that our
construction is direct and does not use PASS and SSE as
generic building blocks. A generic construction from these
two primitives remains currently out of reach due to significant
differences in the syntax, functionality and security amongst
the existing PASS protocols. First, PASS protocols do not
separate registration from secret sharing phase and therefore
do not enforce user authentication upon secret sharing which
would be required for the outsourcing protocol in PAKS.
Existing PASS protocols were proven in different security
models, e.g. BPR-like in [11], [15] and UC-based in [12], [16],
[17], and do not necessarily follow the same functionality and
syntax, which makes it hard to use PASS as a generic building
block in PAKS without revising the syntax and security models
of those PASS protocols. While we could update the syntax
of PASS protocols to allow for a generic usage in PAKS such
update would introduce changes to the original PASS protocols
and require new security proofs. Moreover, generic construc-
tions often lead to less efficient instantiations than directly
constructed schemes. For all the aforementioned reasons we
are not formally proposing a generic PAKS construction in this
paper and opt for a direct and efficient scheme (cf. Section IV)
based on well-known assumptions in the standard model.
Paper organization. We introduce preliminaries and build-
ing blocks in Section II. The syntax and security of the PAKS
scheme are formalized in Section III. Our direct PAKS con-
struction (along with efficiency considerations and comparison
with prior work) is proposed in Section IV and its security is
analysed in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BUILDING BLOCKS
Pedersen commitments [22]. Let g, h be two generators
in a multiplicative cyclic group G with order q, and the
discrete logarithm between h and g is unknown. For a message
m ∈ Z∗q , the Pedersen commitment is computed as c← grhm
where r $← Z∗q and is opened by providing (r,m). We recall
that Pedersen commitments offer computational binding based
the discrete logarithm problem, i.e. assuming AdvDLA (κ) is
negligible, and provide perfect hiding.
Pseudorandom function (PRF) [23], [24]. Let k ∈ KPRF be
a high min-entropy key in the PRF key space. A pseudorandom
function PRF is called (t, q, (κ))-secure if for any PPT algo-
rithm A running in time t with at most q oracle queries the
probability AdvPRFA (κ) ≤ (κ) for distinguishing the outputs of
PRF(k,m) from the outputs of a truly random function f of
the same length, assuming that A has oracle access to OPRF(·)
which contains either PRF(k, ·) or f(·) and which cannot be
queried on m.
Key derivation function (KDF) [25]. Let Σ be a source
of key material. A key derivation function KDF is called
(t, q, (κ))-secure with respect to Σ if for any PPT algorithmA
running in time t with at most q oracle queries the probability
AdvKDFA (κ) ≤ (κ) for distinguishing the output of KDF(k, c)
from uniformly drawn random strings of the same length,
assuming that (k, α) ← Σ where k is the secret key material
and α is some side information. It is assumed that A knows
α, has control over the context information c and has oracle
access to KDF(k, ·) which cannot be queried on c.
Message authentication code [26]. A message authentica-
tion code (KGen, Tag, Vrfy) is comprised of the algorithms
• KGen(κ): on input security parameter κ output key mk←
{0, 1}κ.
• Tag(mk,m): on input a key mk and a message m, output
tag µ← Tag(mk,m).
• Vrfy(mk,m, µ): on input a key mk, a message m and a
tag µ outputs 1 if µ is valid or 0 otherwise.
A MAC is secure if any PPT algorithm A without knowledge
of mk has only negligible probability AdvMACA (κ) to forge a
tag µ∗ for some message m∗. A has access to the tag oracle
OTag(·) which returns µ← Tag(mk,m) on input m. The only
restriction is that m∗ is never queried to OTag(·).
III. PASSWORD AUTHENTICATED KEYWORD SEARCH:
SYNTAX AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we provide definitions for the functionality
of PAKS and its security properties.
A. Syntax of PAKS
After initialization, the functionality of PAKS is defined
by three protocols. These protocols are themselves defined as
interactive algorithms executed by the protocol participants.
Functionality of PAKS. Our PAKS functionality allows any
user U to perform initial registration procedure with any two
servers S0 and S1 in the system and then use the registered
password pi (from some dictionary D) to outsource and retrieve
data based on associated keywords w ∈ W . Each server Sd,
d ∈ {0, 1} maintains its own database where for each user it
records the associated secret information infod obtained dur-
ing the registration procedure and the outsourced data (C, ix)
obtained from multiple executions of the outsource protocol;
C represents ciphertexts for the keywords whereas ix stands
for the outsourced (and typically encrypted) document that
is associated with the encrypted keywords. Similar to other
searchable encryption schemes (e.g. [1]) we do not explicitly
model the encryption of outsourced documents and use indices
ix ∈ I as placeholders instead.
• Setup(1κ) is an initialisation algorithm that on input a
security parameter κ ∈ N generates public parameters
par of the scheme.
• Register is a registration protocol executed between
some user U (running interactive algorithm RegisterU)
and two servers S0 and S1 (running interactive algorithms
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RegisterSd, d ∈ {0, 1}) according to the following
specification:
– RegisterU(par, pi, S0, S1): on input par and some
password pi ← D, this algorithm interacts with
RegisterSd, d ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a flag s ∈
{succ, fail}. If (s = succ), the user remembers
pi and forgets all other informations.
– RegisterSd(par, U, S1-d): on input par this al-
gorithm interacts with RegisterU (and possibly
RegisterS1-d) and at the end of successful interac-
tion stores some secret information infod associated
with U at Sd.
• Outsource is an outsourcing protocol executed between
some user U (running interactive algorithm OutsourceU)
and two servers S0 and S1 (running interactive algorithms
OutsourceSd, d ∈ {0, 1}) according to the following
specification:
– OutsourceU(par, pi, w, ix, S0, S1): on input pi, a
keyword w, and some index ix this algorithms
interacts with OutsourceSd, d ∈ {0, 1} and outputs
a flag s ∈ {succ, fail}.
– OutsourceSd(par, U, infod): on input infod
this algorithm upon successful interaction with
OutsourceU (and possibly OutsourceS1-d) stores
a record (C, ix) in its database Cd.
• Retrieve is a retrieval protocol executed between some
user U (running interactive algorithm RetrieveU) and
two servers S0 and S1 (running interactive algorithms
RetrieveSd, d ∈ {0, 1}) according to the following
specification:
– RetrieveU(par, pi, w, S0, S1): on input pi and a key-
word w this algorithm upon successful interaction
with RetrieveSd, d ∈ {0, 1} outputs set I contain-
ing all ix associated with w.
– RetrieveSd(par, U, infod): on input infod this
algorithm interacts with RetrieveU (and pos-
sibly RetrieveS1-d) and outputs a flag s ∈
{succ, fail}.
Correctness. The PAKS scheme is correct if for all κ ∈
N, ix ∈ I, w ∈ W, pi ∈ D, par← Setup(1κ) the probability
Pr[ix ∈ I ] = 1 iff
〈succ, info0, info1〉 ← 〈RegisterU(par, pi, S0, S1),
RegisterS0(par, U, S1), RegisterS1(par, U, S0)〉;
〈succ, (C, ix), (C, ix)〉 ← 〈OutsourceU(par, pi, w, ix, S0, S1),
OutsourceS0(par, U, info0), OutsourceS1(par, U, info1)〉;
〈I , succ, succ〉 ← 〈RetrieveU(par, pi, w, S0, S1),
RetrieveS0(par, U, info0), RetrieveS1(par, U, info1)〉;
In other words, the user should always be able to retrieve
all indices ix that were previously outsourced under some
keyword w as long as this user is registered and has used its
registered password pi in those outsourcing and in the retrieval
protocol sessions.
ExpIND-CKA-bPAKS,A (κ)
τ ← ∅; i∗ ← (−1); j ← 0;
Set← ∅; par← Setup(1κ);
b′ ← AChind(b,·,·,·,·),Reg(·),Out(·,·,·),Ret(·,·),RetS(·)(par);
return b′
ExpAuthPAKS,A(κ)
τ ← ∅; j ← 0; Set← ∅; par← Setup(1κ);
(i∗, w∗, ix∗)← AReg(·),Out(·,·,·),OutS(·),Ret(·,·)(par);
〈I , succ, succ〉 ← Ret(i∗, w∗);
if (((i∗, w∗, ix∗) 6∈ Set) ∧ (ix∗ ∈ I )) return 1
else return 0
ExpConPAKS,A(κ)
τ ← ∅; i∗ ← (−1); j ← 0;
Set← ∅; par← Setup(1κ);
w1 ← AChcon(·,·,·),Reg(·),Out(·,·,·),Ret(·,·),RetS(·)(par);
〈I , succ, succ〉 ← Ret(i∗, w1);
if (((i∗, w1, ix∗) 6∈ Set) ∧ (ix∗ ∈ I )) return 1
else return 0
Fig. 1. PAKS security experiments. The oracles are defined in Section III-B.
B. Security definitions of PAKS
We define security of PAKS using three main requirements:
indistinguishability against chosen keyword attacks (IND-CKA),
authentication and consistency. We adopt a BPR-like modeling
approach [21] for password-based cryptographic protocols and
define security through experiments (cf. Figure 1) where a PPT
adversary A has full control over the communication channels
and can interact with parties (controlled by a simulator)
through the set of oracles defined in the following.
Adversary model and oracles. For each user U we allow
A to take full control over at most one of the two servers S0
and S1 that were chosen by U during the registration phase to
capture the required distributed trust relationship. We mostly
use Sd to denote the uncorrupted server and S1-d to denote
the server controlled by the adversary. The oracles allow A to
invoke interactive algorithms for all protocols of PAKS which
will be executed (honestly) by the simulator. A can interact
with these algorithms and by this participate in the protocol.
In particular, we allow A to participate in outsourcing and
retrieval protocols on behalf of some corrupted server and also
as some (illegitimate) user who tries to guess the registered
password during the execution of the protocol.
Let τ be an initially empty array that will be populated
with tuples of the form τ [j]← (d, pi, infod) at the end of each
successful j-th registration session such that pi is the registered
password and infod is the secret data stored at the server Sd at
the end of that session. We also use variables i∗ ∈ Z, ix∗ ∈ I
and a set Set that are maintained by the experiments. The
adversary A can access the following oracles.
• Challenge oracle Chind(b, ·, ·, ·, ·): on input (i, w0, w1,
ix∗), the oracle aborts if ((i∗ ≥ 0)∨ (i ≥ j)∨ ((i, w0) ∈
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Set) ∨ ((i, w1) ∈ Set)). Otherwise, it sets i∗ ← i and
invokes oracle Out(i∗, wb, ix∗). Note that this oracle will
be used to model IND-CKA security of PAKS.
• Challenge oracle Chcon(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w0, ix∗), the
oracle aborts if ((i∗ ≥ 0) ∨ (i ≥ j)). Otherwise, it sets
i∗ ← i and invokes oracle Out(i∗, w0, ix∗). Note that
this oracle will be used to model consistency of PAKS.
• Registration oracle Reg(·): on input d ∈ {0, 1}, the exper-
iment first initializes Cd,j ← ∅ as a database for session
j. Then, it randomly picks fresh (pi $← D)∧((i, pi, ·) 6∈ τ )
for all i ∈ [0, j − 1]. The Register protocol is executed
with A where the oracle plays the roles of honest U and
Sd executing algorithms RegisterU(par, pi, S0, S1) and
RegisterSd(par, U, S1-d), respectively, and A plays the
role of corrupted S1-d. After interactions, the experiment
records τ [j]← (d, pi, infod), delivers j to the adversary
and increases j ← j + 1.
• Outsource oracle Out(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w, ix), the
oracle aborts if i ≥ j; or otherwise, it ob-
tains (d, pi, infod) ← τ [i]. The Outsource pro-
tocol is then executed with A where the ora-
cle plays the roles of honest U and Sd execut-
ing algorithms OutsourceU(par, pi, w, ix, S0, S1) and
OutsourceSd(par, U, infod), respectively, and A plays
the role of malicious S1-d. In both Auth and Con exper-
iments, the oracle additionally computes Set ← Set ∪
(i, w, ix).
• Outsource oracle (server only) OutS(·): on input i, the or-
acle aborts if i ≥ j; otherwise, it obtains (d, pi, infod)←
τ [i]. The Outsource protocol is then executed with A
where the oracle plays the role of honest Sd executing
algorithm OutsourceSd(par, U, infod) and A plays the
roles of (illegitimate) U and corrupted S1-d. Note that this
oracle will be used to model authentication of PAKS.
• Retrieve oracle Ret(·, ·): on input (i, w), the oracle
aborts if i ≥ j. In the IND-CKA experiment, the or-
acle also aborts if ((i = i∗) ∧ (w ∈ {w0, w1})).
Otherwise, it obtains the parameters (d, pi, infod) ←
τ [i]. The Retrieve protocol is then executed with A
where the oracle plays the roles of honest U and Sd
executing algorithms RetrieveU(par, pi, w, S0, S1) and
RetrieveSd(par, U, infod), respectively, and A plays
the role of corrupted S1-d. In the IND-CKA experiment,
if (i∗ = −1) the oracle additionally computes Set ←
Set ∪ (i, w).
• Retrieve oracle (server only) RetS(·): on input i, the ora-
cle aborts if i ≥ j; otherwise, it obtains (d, pi, infod)←
τ [i]. The Retrieve protocol is then executed with A
where the oracle plays the role of honest Sd executing
algorithm RetrieveSd(par, U, infod) and A plays the
roles of (illegitimate) U and corrupted S1-d. Note that this
oracle will be used to models IND-CKA and Con-security
of PAKS.
Indistinguishability against Chosen Keyword Attacks
(IND-CKA). The IND-CKA property for PAKS is defined through
the experiment ExpIND-CKA-bPAKS,A (κ) (cf. Figure 1) and is closely
related to [5] except that our setting is based on passwords. A
is given the public parameters par and permitted to adaptively
access oracles Chind(b, ·, ·, ·, ·), Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·)
and RetS(·) at most 1, qr, qo, qt and qs times, respectively.
In particular, our IND-CKA experiment captures the following
ways that A may try to retrieve data: (i) from interaction with
an honest user U and the honest server Sd playing the role of
corrupted S1-d (which is captured through the oracle Ret(·, ·)),
or (ii) from interaction with the honest server Sd playing the
role of illegitimate user, e.g. trying to guess the registered
password, and the corrupted server S1-d (which is captured
through the oracle RetS(·)).
Let AdvIND-CKAPAKS,A (κ)
def
= Pr[b′ = b : b′ ← ExpIND-CKA-bPAKS,A (κ)]− 12
denote the advantage of A in the IND-CKA security experiment.
A PAKS scheme is called IND-CKA-secure if the probability
AdvIND-CKAPAKS,A (κ) ≤ qs|D| + (κ) where |D| is the dictionary size
and (κ) is negligible in the security parameter κ. Note that
probability qs|D| relates to the use of oracle RetS(·) that models
on-line dictionary attacks and assumes uniform distribution of
passwords within D, as is also common in BPR-like models.
Authentication (Auth). The property of authentication for
PAKS is defined using experiment ExpAuthPAKS,A(κ) in Figure 1.
A is given the public parameters par and permitted to access
oracles Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), OutS(·) and Ret(·, ·) with at most
qr, qo, qs and qt times, respectively. Our experiment effectively
captures attacks where A tries to outsource some data ix∗ on
behalf of some user U without knowing the registered password
(via OutS(·) oracle), possibly after having interacted with U
and the honest server Sd. In its attack on authentication A can
play the role of a corrupted server S1-d and also mount man-in-
the-middle attacks on sessions of Outsource and Retrieve
protocols involving user U.
A PAKS scheme provides authentication if for all PPT A
the probability AdvAuthPAKS,A(κ) = Pr[1 ← ExpAuthPAKS,A(κ)] ≤
qs
|D| + (κ). As in the IND-CKA case, we again need to account
for the possibility of online guessing attacks via the oracle
OutS(·).
Consistency (Con). We define consistency of PAKS using
experiment ExpConPAKS,A(κ) in Figure 1, adapting this notion
from [1] to the PAKS setting. The property aims to rule
out false positives when performing the keyword search. A
is given the public parameters par and permitted to access
oracles Chcon(·, ·, ·), Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·)
with at most 1, qr, qo, qt and qs times, respectively. In
particular, A should not be able to come up with different
keywords w0 and w1 from which w0 will be used by an honest
user to outsource some data ix∗ (via Chcon(·, ·, ·) oracle)
and w1 used to retrieve this data later. A PAKS scheme is
called consistent if the probability AdvConPAKS,A(κ) = Pr[1 ←
ExpConPAKS,A(κ)] ≤ qs|D| + (κ).
IV. OUR DIRECT PAKS CONSTRUCTION
In this section we propose a direct and efficient construction
of PAKS. It follows our general idea of combining suitable
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public inputs: G, q, g, h,H, KDF1, KDF2, PRF, MAC
User U(pi,w, ix) Server Sd(xd, gr1 , gr2 , Cpi ,Kd, mkd)
a
$← Z∗q , A← gahpi A sd, yd $← Z∗q , Yd ← gyd
Rd ← (gr2 )yd , cd ← gsdhH(Yd,Rd) cd
c1-d
on input c1-d Yd, Rd, sd
if (c1-d = gs1-dhH(Y1-d,R1-d)) Y1-d, R1-d, s1-d
Y ← Y0Y1, R← R0R1
e
$← {0, 1}κ Zd ← Kd(CpiA-1)yd (gr1R)-xd
on input (Y, Z0, µ0), (Y, Z1, µ1) Y, Zd, µd µd ← Tag(mkd, (A, Y, Zd))
K ← Z0Z1Y a else abort;
for all d ∈ {0, 1}
mkd ← KDF1(K, Sd, ‘1’)
if (Vrfy(mkd, (A, Y, Zd), µd) = 0)
abort;
t← KDF2(K,w), v ← PRF(t, e)
mku ← KDF1(K, U, ‘0’)
µc ← Tag(mku, (e, v, ix))
skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’) skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’)
C ← (e, v, µc), µskd ← Tag(skd, (C, ix)) (C, ix), µskd if (Vrfy(skd, (C, ix), µskd ) = 1)
store (C, ix) on Cd
else abort;
Fig. 2. The Outsource protocol between U and Sd. The server-side algorithm includes communication between servers Sd and S1-d.
password-authenticated secret sharing with symmetric search-
able encryption techniques. In the introduction we explained
the difficulties behind an attempt to construct PAKS generi-
cally using PASS and SSE schemes and motivated our choice
for a direct construction.
High-level idea. Our PAKS protocol is inspired by the
techniques used in the recent password-authenticated secret
sharing protocol from [15] which we modified to address the
functionality and requirements of PAKS and extended with a
suitable mechanism for symmetric searchable encryption of
keywords. In particular, we define a new registration protocol
Register upon which the user registers its password pi en-
crypted in Cpi with both servers and also picks a symmetric key
K for which it computes appropriate shares K0 and K1 which
are then sent to the corresponding servers. The reconstruction
of K is protected by pi and MAC codes µd are used to
ensure the validity of K upon its reconstruction. The protocols
Outsource and Retrieve proceed according to the similar
pattern. First, the user reconstructs K using its password pi
after communication with both servers. Then, in Outsource
protocol U uses K in combination with its keyword w to derive
a trapdoor t ← KDF2(K,w) and a fresh randomness e to
derive verifier v ← PRF(t, e). The pair (e, v) becomes part
of the outsourced ciphertext C which is bound to some data
ix. During the Retrieve protocol the user can recompute
the trapdoor t for a given keyword w and then send it to
the servers who can the find all outsourced ciphertexts C for
which v ← PRF(t, e) holds and hence identify which data ix
needs to be returned. In order to prevent servers from creating
their own pairs (e, v) for a given t the outsourced ciphertext C
additionally includes a MAC tag µc which authenticates (e, v)
and also ix and which can only be computed and verified
using K. During the Retrieve protocol the user will ensure
that it final search result contains only data that passes this
integrity and authenticity check. In addition both protocols
make use of MACs to ensure authenticity of messages, where
the MAC keys are derived from K on the user side. We
emphasis that our PAKS construction is in the password-only
setting where servers are not required to possess any public
keys for the security of the PAKS scheme. However, if the
registration protocol Register is performed remotely over a
public network then this protocol needs to be executed over
server-authenticated secure-channels (e.g. TLS). In order to
enable reconstruction of K by the user and to protect this
phase with the password both servers communicate with each
other as part of the Outsource and Retrieve protocols.
While in practice this communication between the two servers
will likely be protected using a secure channel (e.g. TLS) we
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public inputs: G, q, g, h,H, KDF1, KDF2, PRF, MAC
User U(pi,w) Server Sd(xd, gr1 , gr2 , Cpi ,Kd, mkd)
a
$← Z∗q , A← gahpi A sd, yd $← Z∗q , Yd ← gyd
Rd ← (gr2 )yd , cd ← gsdhH(Yd,Rd) cd
c1-d
on input c1-d Yd, Rd, sd
if (c1-d = gs1-dhH(Y1-d,R1-d)) Y1-d, R1-d, s1-d
Y ← Y0Y1, R← R0R1
Zd ← Kd(CpiA-1)yd (gr1R)-xd
on input (Y, Z0, µ0), (Y, Z1, µ1) Y, Zd, µd µd ← Tag(mkd, (A, Y, Zd))
K ← Z0Z1Y a else abort;
for all d ∈ {0, 1}
mkd ← KDF1(K, Sd, ‘1’)
if (Vrfy(mkd, (A, Y, Zd), µd) = 0)
abort; Ad ← ∅
skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’) skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’)
t← KDF2(K,w), µskd ← Tag(skd, t) t, µskd if (Vrfy(skd, t, µskd ) = 1)
for all (C, ix) ∈ Cd
(e, v, µc)← C
mku ← KDF1(K, U, ‘0’) if (v = PRF(t, e))
A ← A0 ∪A1, I ← ∅ Ad Ad ← Ad ∪ (C, ix)
for all (C, ix) ∈ A else abort;
(e, v, µc)← C
if (v = PRF(t, e) ∧ Vrfy(mku, (e, v, ix), µc) = 1)
I ← I ∪ ix
return I
Fig. 3. The Retrieve protocol between U and Sd. The server-side algorithm includes communication between servers Sd and S1-d.
stress that in our protocols this communication can take place
over an insecure channel.
Detailed description. In the following we provide a detailed
description of all algorithms and protocols underlying our
direct PAKS scheme, along with Figures 2 and 3 that illustrate
the protocols Outsource and Retrieve, respectively.
• Setup(1κ): Generated public parameters par contain
{G, q, g, h, KDF1, KDF2, PRF, MAC}, where (G, q, g, h) rep-
resents a multiplicative cyclic group G with a prime order
q and generators g, h $← G where the discrete logarithm
of h with respect to base g is unknown. H : G×G→ Z∗q
is a collision-resistant hash function. KDF1 : {0, 1}∗ →
KMAC and KDF2 : G×W → KPRF are two key derivation
functions. PRF : KPRF × {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}κ is a pseudo-
random function. MAC = (KGen, Tag, Vrfy) is a message
authentication code with Tag : KMAC×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ
and Vrfy : KMAC × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}κ → {0, 1} where
KPRF and KMAC are PRF and MAC key spaces, respectively.
We assume that passwords from D are represented as
elements of Z∗q .
• Protocol Register: User U picks r1, r2, x0, x1
$← Z∗q
and K,K0
$← G; computes X ← gx0+x1 , K1 ←
Xr1K(K0)
-1 and Cpi ← Xr2hpi . Then, for d ∈
{0, 1}, the user computes mkd ← KDF1(K, Sd, ‘1’), sets
infod ← (xd, gr1 , gr2 , Cpi,Kd, mkd) and sends infod to
server Sd, d ∈ {0, 1} over server-authenticated secure
channels. Finally, U memorizes pi.
• Protocol Outsource: For d ∈ {0, 1}, the Outsource
protocol between U and Sd is illustrated in Figure 2
and detailed in the following. Note that as part of the
Outsource protocol both S0 and S1 communicate with
each other, possibly over an insecure channel.
1) User U randomly selects a $← Z∗q , e $← {0, 1}κ and
sends A← gahpi to both servers.
2) On input A, server Sd executes following steps:
a) Pick sd, yd
$← Z∗q , compute Yd ← gyd , Rd ←
(gr2)yd .
b) Send Pedersen commitment cd ← gsdhH(Yd,Rd)
to server S1-d and wait for its response c1-d.
6
TABLE I
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON WITH PASSWORD-ONLY PASS SCHEMES.
Computation cost (unit: exp) Communication cost (unit: bits) Rounds
Sharing Retrieval Sharing Retrieval Sharing Retrieval
user server user server user-server user-server server-server
BJSL11 [11] 6 0 33 16 24q + 4κ 22q + 2κ 0 1 2
JKK14 [14] 4 1 11 4 8q + 4κ 8q + 4κ 0 1 1
YCHL15 [15] 1 0 7 12 6κ 10q 8q 1 1
JKKX16 [17] 3 1 3 1 8q + 4κ 8q + 4κ 0 2 1
In our PAKS scheme 6 0 3 8 8q + 2κ 6q 6q + 2κ 1 1
c) Send the opening (Yd, Rd, sd) to server S1-d and
wait for its response (Y1-d, R1-d, s1-d). If c1-d 6=
gs1-dhH(Y1-d,R1-d) then abort.
d) Send (Y,Zd, µd) to U where Y ← Y0Y1, R ←
R0R1, µd ← Tag(mkd, (A, Y, Zd)) and Zd ←
Kd(CpiA
-1)yd(gr1R)-xd .
3) Upon receiving (Y,Z0, µ0) and (Y, Z1, µ1) from
both servers, user U executes following steps:
a) If Vrfy(mkd, (A, Y, Zd), µd) = 0 for any d ∈
{0, 1} then abort, else compute K ← Z0Z1Y a.
b) Compute t ← KDF2(K,w), v ← PRF(t,
e), mku ← KDF1(K, U, ‘0’), µc ←
Tag(mku, (e, v, ix)) and C ← (e, v, µc).
c) Send ((C, ix), µskd) to server Sd, d ∈ {0, 1}
where µskd ← Tag(skd, (C, ix)) using skd ←
KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’).
4) On input ((C, ix), µskd), server Sd stores (C, ix) in
its database Cd if Vrfy(skd, (C, ix), µskd) = 1 for
skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’), else Sd aborts.
• Protocol Retrieve: For d ∈ {0, 1}, the Retrieve
protocol between U and Sd is illustrated in Figure 3
and detailed in the following. Note that as part of the
Outsource protocol both S0 and S1 communicate with
each other, possibly over an insecure channel.
1) User U randomly selects a $← Z∗q and sends A ←
gahpi to both servers.
2) On input A, server Sd executes following steps:
a) Pick sd, yd
$← Z∗q , compute Yd ← gyd , Rd ←
(gr2)yd .
b) Send Pedersen commitment cd ← gsdhH(Yd,Rd)
to server S1-d and wait for its response c1-d.
c) Send opening (Yd, Rd, sd) to server S1-d and
waits for its response (Y1-d, R1-d, s1-d). If
c1-d 6= gs1-dhH(Y1-d,R1-d) then abort.
d) Send (Y, Zd, µd) to U where Y ← Y0Y1, R ←
R0R1, µd ← Tag(mkd, (A, Y, Zd)) and Zd ←
Kd(CpiA
-1)yd(gr1R)-xd .
3) Upon receiving (Y, Z0, µ0) and (Y,Z1, µ1) from
both servers, U executes following steps:
a) If Vrfy(mkd, (A, Y, Zd), µd) = 0 for any d ∈
{0, 1} then abort, else compute K ← Z0Z1Y a.
b) Compute t ← KDF2(K,w) and µskd ←
Tag(skd, t) using skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’).
Send (t, µskd) to Sd, d ∈ {0, 1}.
4) On input (t, µskd), server Sd executes following
steps:
a) If Vrfy(skd, t, µskd) = 0 then abort, else com-
pute skd ← KDF1(mkd, A, Y, ‘2’).
b) Initialize set Ad ← ∅. For all (C, ix) ∈ Cd,
parse (e, v, µc) ← C and add (C, ix) to Ad if
v = PRF(t, e). Finally, send Ad to U.
5) Upon receiving A0 and A1, user U initializes an
empty set I ← ∅. Then, for all (C, ix) ∈ (A0∪A1),
parses (e, v, µc) ← C and adds ix to I if v =
PRF(t, e) and Vrfy(mku, (e, v, ix), µc) = 1. This
step guarantees that only outsourced data for which
the integrity check was performed successfully will
be added to the output set I .
The correctness of the protocol can be easily verified once
we illustrate here that if the correct password pi is used by
the user in the Outsource and Retrieve protocols then the
reconstruction through Z0Z1Y a results in a correct key K:
Z0Z1Y
a =K0(CpiA
-1)y0(gr1R)-x0 ·
K1(CpiA
-1)y1(gr1R)-x1 · ga(y0+y1)
=Xr1K(Xr2g-a)y0+y1(gr1R)-(x0+x1)ga(y0+y1)
=Xr1KXr2(y0+y1)X-(r1)X-r2(y0+y1) = K
A. Efficiency comparison
Given that our direct PAKS construction follows the general
idea of building PAKS protocols based on the techniques used
for password-authenticated secret sharing, we compare perfor-
mance with existing PASS protocols. Since our PAKS scheme
assumes password-only setting (except for the registration) we
restrict our comparison to password-only PASS schemes [11],
[14], [15], [17] and compare only the costs that arise from
the sharing and retrieval of the symmetric key K — note that
in our PAKS scheme sharing of K is performed as part of
the Register protocol whereas retrieval of K is part of both
Outsource and Retrieve protocols and is accomplished in
step 3 of these protocols. Since our PAKS scheme adopts a
two-server architecture but the aforementioned PASS schemes
were designed for a more general t-out-of-n threshold setting
we consider their costs for the special case of t = n = 2
to ease the comparison. The results of the comparison are
presented in Table I. We compare computation costs through
the number of modular exponentiations for the user and each
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of the servers during the sharing and retrieval phases of the
symmetric key K. We also compare communication costs
in the number of bits communicated in both phases, while
considering user-server and server-server communications. For
the lengths of elements in G and Z∗q we use |G| = q and
|q| = κ bits, respectively. We also compare the number of
rounds needed for the sharing and retrieval of K.
We observe that in terms of computation and communi-
cation costs key sharing and reconstruction phases in our
PAKS scheme compare fairly well with those of existing
PASS protocols. In particular, only [17] which is the most
computationally efficient PASS protocol today offers better
overall computation and communication performance. We
stress however that for PAKS protocols the efficiency of the
retrieval phase is of greater importance than of the sharing
phase. This is because in PAKS sharing of K is performed
only once as part of the registration procedure, but retrieval of
K occurs each time the user wants to outsource data or search
for keywords. Furthermore, due to the simplified key manage-
ment (i.e. reliance on passwords only) PAKS offers device-
agnostic use of the functionality to the user and can possibly
be executed on different client devices (ranging from desktops
over to smartphones). In this case it becomes important to
keep the costs associated with computations on the user side
and the user-server communication low. Considering this we
observe that in comparison to [17] our PAKS scheme achieves
similar and even partly better performance for computations
and communication involving the user device.
As a result of our comparison we conclude that our PAKS
scheme is sufficiently practical since the additional costs
arising from the encrypted keyword search functionality within
our PAKS protocols are negligible (due to the nature of
computations involved) in comparison to the costly key sharing
and retrieval steps.
B. Extensions with multiple keywords
In the given specification of our PAKS construction users
can use only one keyword w in each execution of Outsource
and Retrieve protocols at a time. Often, users may want to be
able to outsource or search for documents associated with mul-
tiple keywords. Our PAKS scheme can be extended to provide
efficient support for multiple keywords. Letw = (w1, . . . , wn)
be a set of outsourced keywords for some document ix and
let w ′ = (w′1, . . . , w
′
m) be a set of searched keywords. In the
following we show how to support (i) outsourcing of ix with
w through a single session of the Outsource protocol and (ii)
search for all suitable documents ix using w ′ through a single
session of the Retrieve protocol, based on three different
types of search queries [8]: conjunctive queries (w = w ′),
disjunctive queries (|w ∩w ′| > 0), and those for a subset of
keywords (w ′ ⊆ w).
Outsourcing documents with multiple keywords. In order
to outsource some document ix associated with multiple
keywords w = (w1, . . . , wn), user U can compute v =
(v1, . . . , vn), ti ← KDF2(K,wi) and vi ← PRF(ti, e) for
i = 1, · · · , n, and µc ← Tag(mku, (e,v)) as part of the same
Outsource execution and outsource C ← (e,v, µc) as the
resulting ciphertext to both servers.
Search queries with multiple keywords. In order to search
for documents using multiple keywords, i.e. w′1, . . . , w
′
m, m ≤
n, within a single execution of the Retrieve protocol, user
U can send a set of authenticated trapdoors ti = KDF2(K,wi)
for all searched keywords w′i, i = 1, · · · ,m to both servers.
Then, for all (C, ix) = (e,v, µc, ix) stored in the database
Cd, server Sd can initialize an empty output set Ad, compute
v ′ = (v′1, · · · , v′m) where v′i = PRF(ti, e), i = 1, . . . ,m, and
update the output set Ad ← Ad ∪ (C, ix) according to the
following conditions, depending on the type of search search
query, i.e.
• for conjunctive queries w′1 ∧ . . . ∧ w′m: if v = v ′
• for disjunctive queries w′1 ∨ . . . ∨ w′m: if |v ∩ v ′| > 0
• for subset queries (w′1, . . . , w
′
m) ⊆ w: if v ′ ⊆ v .
C. Password change
Our PAKS scheme allows users to change their pass-
words without changing the encryption keys K, avoiding re-
encryption of outsourced keywords. A new password pi∗ can
be registered with the knowledge of the current pi as follows:
1) User U sends A ← gahpi to both servers (as in
Outsource and Retrieve). Each server Sd, d ∈ {0, 1}
uses its infod to respond with (Y,Zd, gr2 , Cpi, µd)
where µd ← Tag(mkd, (Y,Zd, gr2 , Cpi)).
2) Upon reconstructing mkd as in Outsource and
Retrieve protocols and verifying µd, the user picks
random r∗ $← Z∗q , computes Cpi∗ ← (Cpih-pi)r
∗
hpi
∗
and µ∗d ← Tag(mkd, (gr2)r
∗
, Cpi∗), and sends
(gr2r
∗
, Cpi∗ , µ
∗
d) to both servers.
3) If Vrfy(mkd, (gr2r
∗
, Cpi∗), µ
∗
d) = 1 then each Sd re-
places (gr2 , Cpi) in its infod with (gr2r
∗
, Cpi∗).
Note that current pi is used to authenticate the user towards
both servers. If the user no longer remembers pi then changing
the password while keeping the encryption key K would
require additional authentication mechanisms based on which
U would be able to retrieve infod from Sd to reconstruct and
re-share K with the new pi∗, as in the registration phase.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PAKS
In the following we prove the security of our direct PAKS
scheme using our definitions from Section III-B. In the proofs
we adopt the standard game-hopping technique. Let succn
denote the event that the adversary wins in the experiment n.
A. IND-CKA-security of our PAKS scheme
Theorem 1: Our direct PAKS construction is IND-CKA-
secure assuming the hardness of the DDH problem and security
of KDF1, KDF2, PRF and MAC.
Proof. Experiment ExpIND0 . The simulator initializes
τ , i∗, j, Set and par ← {G, q, g, h,H, KDF1, KDF2, PRF, MAC}
as defined in the real security experiment ExpIND-CKA-bPAKS,A (κ).
The oracles Chind(b, ·, ·, ·, ·), Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and
RetS(·) are implemented as follows.
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• Chind(b, ·, ·, ·, ·): on input (i, w0, w1, ix∗) the oracle
aborts if ((i∗ ≥ 0)∨(i ≥ j)∨((i, w0) ∈ Set)∨((i, w1) ∈
Set)); otherwise, it sets i∗ ← i and invokes oracle
Out(i∗, wb, ix∗).
• Reg(·): on input d ∈ {0, 1} the simulator randomly
selects fresh pi $← D and K $← G and initialises an
empty database Cd,j . The simulator and A complete
the Register protocol, where the simulator plays the
roles of U and Sd, and A plays the role of S1-d. The
oracle sends j to A as a session identifier. Finally,
it records τ [j] ← (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d), infod ←
(S1-d, xd, gr1 , gr2 , Cpi,Kd, mkd), increments j ← j + 1,
and stores r2 and x1-d for later use in the proof.
• Out(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w, ix), the simulator aborts if
(i ≥ j); otherwise, it obtains (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d) ←
τ [i]. Then, the simulator plays the roles of U and Sd
and interacts with A who plays the role of S1-d in the
Outsource protocol.
• Ret(·, ·): on input (i, w), the simulator aborts if (i ≥
j)∨ ((i = i∗)∧ (w ∈ {w0, w1})); or otherwise, it obtains
(d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d)← τ [i]. Then, it plays the roles of
U and Sd and interacts with A who plays the role of S1-d
party in the Retrieve protocol. Finally, the simulator
computes Set← Set ∪ (i, w) if (i∗ = −1).
• RetS(·): on input i, the simulator aborts if (i ≥ j); other-
wise, it obtains parameters (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d)← τ [i]
and executes RetrieveSd(par, U, infod).
Lemma 1: AdvIND-CKAPAKS,A (κ) = Pr[succIND0 ]− 1/2
Experiment ExpIND1 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND0
except that the simulator aborts if some value for yd used on
behalf of honest server Sd appears in two different protocol
sessions through oracles Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·).
Lemma 2: Pr[succIND0 ] = Pr[succIND1 ]
Experiment ExpIND2 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND1
except that the simulator aborts if some value for Y appears
in two different protocol sessions executed through oracles
Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·).
1) By the perfect hiding property of Pedersen commit-
ments, value Y1-d is guaranteed to be independent from
Yd because the adversary acquires nothing from cd.
2) Due to the binding property of Pedersen commitments,
which is based on the hardness of the DL problem, it is
hard to open c1-d to a different Y ′1-d 6= Y1-d.
Since Y1-d is guaranteed to be independent from Yd; and Yd
is fresh, we can follow that Y is fresh based on the hardness
of the DL problem.
Lemma 3: |Pr[succIND1 ]− Pr[succIND2 ]| ≤ AdvDLA (κ)
Experiment ExpIND3 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND2 ex-
cept that in oracles Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·), the mes-
sage (Zd, µd) from the honest server Sd to the user is replaced
with (E,µ′d) where E
$← G and µ′d ← Tag(mkd, A, Y,E). We
discuss the following two cases:
1) For the oracles Out(·, ·, ·) and Ret(·, ·), let (g, gα, gβ , Q)
be an instance of the DDH problem, the simulator aims
to output 1 if Q = gαβ ; or 0 otherwise. The simulator
sets A← gαhpi , Yd ← gβ , Rd ← (gβ)r2 and
Zd ← Kd(gβ)r2(x0+x1)Q-1(gr1 · (gβ)r2 ·R1-d)-xd
If Q = gαβ , this experiment is identical to ExpIND2 ;
otherwise, to ExpIND3 . The hardness of the DDH problem
implies the indistinguishability of ExpIND2 from Exp
IND
3 .
2) For oracle RetS(·), assume pi′ is the password
tried by A, the key K (in ExpIND2 ) is equal to
Z0Z1Y
ah(pi−pi
′)(y0+y1); under the DDH assumption, the
adversary cannot distinguish h(pi−pi
′)(y0+y1) (in ExpIND2 )
from a random number in G (in ExpIND3 ) unless pi′ = pi
which denotes a successful on-line dictionary attack. By
the uniform distribution of passwords, its probability is
estimated as qs ·AdvDDHA (κ) + qs|D| .
Lemma 4: |Pr[succIND2 ] − Pr[succIND3 ]| ≤ (qs +
1)AdvDDHA (κ) +
qs
|D|
Experiment ExpIND4 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND3
except that in each session i, values mku ← KDF1(K, U, ‘0’),
mkd ← KDF1(K, Sd, ‘1’), mk1-d ← KDF1(K, S1-d, ‘1’) are
replaced with mku ← F1(i, U, ‘0’), mkd ← F1(i, Sd, ‘1’) and
mk1-d ← F1(i, S1-d, ‘1’), respectively. A table T1 is initialized
to be empty in the beginning of ExpIND4 . The deterministic
function F1 : {0, 1}∗ → KMAC is defined as follows: if
∃(i, id, k, mk) ∈ T1 then F1(i, id, k) returns mk; otherwise,
the simulator randomly picks a fresh mk $← KMAC, stores
(i, id, k, mk) in T1 and returns mk where fresh means that no
record of the form (·, ·, ·, mk) ∈ T1 exists so far. Since A
only acquires mk1-d, by the uniform distribution of K and the
security of KDF1, we obtain
Lemma 5: |Pr[succIND3 ]− Pr[succIND4 ]| ≤ qr ·AdvKDFA (κ)
Experiment ExpIND5 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND4
except that in each session i of oracles Out(·, ·, ·) and Ret(·, ·),
value t ← KDF2(K,w) is replaced with t ← F2(i, w). T2
is initialized as an empty table in the beginning of ExpIND5 .
F2 returns t if ∃(i, w, t) ∈ T2; otherwise, F2 picks a fresh
t
$← KPRF, stores (i, w, t) in T2 and returns t where fresh
means that no record of the form (·, ·, t) exists in T2. By the
uniform distribution of K and the security of KDF2, we have
Lemma 6: |Pr[succIND4 ] − Pr[succIND5 ]| ≤ (qo +
qt)Adv
KDF
A (κ)
Experiment ExpIND6 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND5
except for one of the following cases:
1) For the oracle Out(·, ·, ·), the adversary success-
fully forges ((C, ix), µskd) which satisfies Vrfy(skd,
(C, ix), µskd) = 1.
2) For the oracles Ret(·, ·) or RetS(·), the adversary suc-
cessfully forges (t, µskd) which satisfies Vrfy(skd, t,
µskd) = 1.
By the unforgeability of MAC, we have
Lemma 7: |Pr[succIND5 ] − Pr[succIND6 ]| ≤ (qo + qt +
qs)Adv
MAC
A (κ)
Experiment ExpIND7 . This experiment is similar to ExpIND6
except that in oracles Out(·, ·, ·) and Ret(·, ·), the value v is set
in a different way. Let OPRF(·) be the oracle from the security
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experiment of the pseudorandom function PRF; and let Tv be
initialized as an empty table in the beginning of ExpIND7 . When
the simulator needs to compute v ← PRF(t, e) in session i, it
obtains v using table Tv . If ∃(i, t, e, rv, v) ∈ Tv , the simulator
uses v from Tv; otherwise, it randomly picks rv
$← {0, 1}κ,
stores (i, t, e, rv,OPRF(rv)) in Tv and obtains v ← OPRF(rv).
Assuming the pseudorandomness of PRF, we have
Lemma 8: Pr[succIND7 ] ≤ 1/2 + (qo + qt)AdvPRFA (κ)
As a consequence, based on Lemmas 1 to 8 we can
conclude that our proposed PAKS construction is IND-CKA-
secure assuming the intractability of the DDH problem and
security of KDF1, KDF2, PRF and MAC.
B. Authentication property of our PAKS scheme
Theorem 2: Our proposed PAKS construction provides
authentication based on the hardness of the DDH problem and
security of KDF1, KDF2 and MAC.
Proof. Experiment ExpAuth0 . The simulator initializes
τ , j, Set and par ← {G, q, g, h,H, KDF1, KDF2, PRF, MAC} as
defined in the real security experiment ExpAuthPAKS,A(κ). The
oracles Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), OutS(·) and Ret(·, ·) are executed
by the simulator as follows.
• Reg(·): on input d ∈ {0, 1} the simulator randomly
selects a fresh pi $← D and K $← G, and initializes
an empty database Cd,j . Then, the simulator and A
execute the Register protocol, where the simulator
plays the role of U, Sd and A plays the role of S1-d. The
simulator then sends j to A as a session identifier. Finally,
the simulator records τ [j] ← (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d),
infod ← (S1-d, xd, gr1 , gr2 , Cpi,Kd, mkd), increments
j ← j + 1, and stores r2 and x1-d for later use in the
proof.
• Out(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w, ix), the simulator aborts if (i ≥
j); otherwise, it obtains (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d) ← τ [i].
Then, it sets Set← Set∪ (i, w, ix). Finally, it plays the
roles of U and Sd, and interacts with A who plays the
role of S1-d party in the Outsource protocol.
• OutS(·): on input i, the simulator aborts if (i ≥ j); other-
wise, it obtains parameters (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d)← τ [i]
and executes OutsourceSd(par, U, infod).
• Ret(·, ·): on input (i, w), the simulator aborts if (i ≥ j);
otherwise, it obtains parameters (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d)←
τ [i]. Then, it plays the roles of U and Sd, and interacts
with A who plays the role of S1-d in the Retrieve
protocol.
Lemma 9: AdvAuthPAKS,A(κ) = Pr[succAuth0 ]
Experiment ExpAuth1 . This experiment is similar to ExpAuth0
except that the value yd is ensured to be fresh in every session
executed by the simulator through the oracles Out(·, ·, ·),
OutS(·) and Ret(·, ·).
Lemma 10: Pr[succAuth0 ] = Pr[succAuth1 ]
Experiment ExpAuth2 . This experiment is similar to ExpAuth1
except that the simulator aborts if a value for Y repeats in two
different sessions of the protocol executed by the simulator
through oracles Out(·, ·, ·), OutS(·), and Ret(·, ·).
1) By the perfect hiding of Pedersen commitments, values
of Y1-d are guaranteed to be independent from Yd
because the adversary acquires nothing from cd.
2) Because of the binding property of Pedersen commit-
ments, which is based on the hardness of the DL
problem, it is hard to open c1-d to a different value
Y ′1-d 6= Y1-d.
Since Y1-d is guaranteed to be independent from Yd and Yd
is fresh, the freshness of Y is implied by the hardness of the
DL problem.
Lemma 11: |Pr[succAuth1 ]− Pr[succAuth2 ]| ≤ AdvDLA (κ)
Experiment ExpAuth3 . This experiment is similar to ExpAuth2
except that in oracles Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and OutS(·), the
message (Zd, µd) from the honest server Sd to the user
is replaced with (E,µ′d) where E
$← G and µ′d ←
Tag(mkd, A, Y,E). We consider the following two case:
1) For oracles Out(·, ·, ·) and Ret(·, ·), let (g, gα, gβ , Q) be
an instance of the DDH problem, the simulator aims to
output 1 if Q = gαβ ; or 0 otherwise. The simulator sets
A← gαhpi , Yd ← gβ , Rd ← (gβ)r2 and
Zd ← Kd(gβ)r2(x0+x1)Q-1(gr1 · (gβ)r2 ·R1-d)-xd
If Q = gαβ , then this experiment is identical to ExpAuth2 ;
otherwise, it is identical to ExpAuth3 . The hardness of the
DDH problem directly implies the indistinguishability of
ExpAuth2 from Exp
Auth
3 .
2) For the oracle OutS(·), assume pi′ is a password used
by the adversary, the key K (in ExpAuth2 ) is equal
to Z0Z1Y ah(pi−pi
′)(y0+y1); under the DDH assumption,
the adversary cannot distinguish h(pi−pi
′)(y0+y1) (in
ExpAuth2 ) from a random number in G (in ExpAuth3 )
unless pi′ = pi which denotes a successful on-line dictio-
nary attack. By the uniform distribution of passwords,
its probability is estimated as qs ·AdvDDHA (κ) + qs|D| .
Lemma 12: |Pr[succAuth2 ] − Pr[succAuth3 ]| ≤ (qs +
1)AdvDDHA (κ) +
qs
|D|
Experiment ExpAuth4 . This experiment is similar to ExpAuth3
except that in each session i, values for mku ←
KDF1(K, U, ‘0’), mkd ← KDF1(K, Sd, ‘1’), mk1-d ←
KDF1(K, S1-d, ‘1’) are replaced with mku ← F1(i, U, ‘0’),
mkd ← F1(i, Sd, ‘1’) and mk1-d ← F1(i, S1-d, ‘1’), respec-
tively. A table T1 is initialized to be empty in the beginning
of ExpAuth4 . A deterministic function F1 : {0, 1}∗ → KMAC
is defined as follows: if ∃(i, id, k, mk) ∈ T1, F1(i, id, k)
then return mk; otherwise, the simulator randomly picks a
fresh mk $← KMAC, stores (i, id, k, mk) on T1 and returns
mk ← F1(i, id, k) where fresh means that no record of the
form (·, ·, ·, mk) ∈ T1 exists so far. Since the adversary only
acquires mk1-d, by the uniform distribution of K as well as
the security of KDF1, we obtain
Lemma 13: |Pr[succAuth3 ]−Pr[succAuth4 ]| ≤ qr ·AdvKDFA (κ)
Experiment ExpAuth5 . This experiment is similar to ExpAuth4
except that in each session i for the oracles Out(·, ·, ·) and
Ret(·, ·), the value t ← KDF2(K,w) is replaced with t ←
F2(i, w). T2 is initialized as an empty table in the beginning
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of ExpAuth5 . Function F2 returns t if ∃(i, w, t) ∈ T2; otherwise,
the simulator randomly picks a fresh t $← KPRF, stores (i, w, t)
on table T2 and returns t where fresh means that no record of
the form (·, ·, t) exists so far in T2 . By the uniform distribution
of K and the security of KDF2, we obtain
Lemma 14: |Pr[succAuth4 ] − Pr[succAuth5 ]| ≤ (qo +
qt)Adv
KDF
A (κ)
We observe that ExpAuth5 is simulated independent the key
K. The only probability of winning ExpAuth5 comes from
the adversary successfully forging µc for (e, v, ix) such that
Vrfy(mku, (e, v, ix), µc) = 1. Assuming that MAC is unforge-
able, we obtain
Lemma 15: Pr[succAuth5 ] = AdvMACA (κ)
To sum, by Lemmas 9 to 15, we can conclude that our direct
PAKS scheme provides authentication based on the hardness
of the DDH problem and security of KDF1, KDF2 and MAC.
C. Consistency property of our PAKS scheme
Theorem 3: Our direct PAKS construction offers consis-
tency based on the hardness of the DDH problem and security
of KDF1, KDF2, PRF and MAC.
Proof. Experiment ExpCon0 . The simulator initializes
τ , i∗, j, Set and par ← {G, q, g, h,H, KDF1, KDF2, PRF, MAC}
as defined in the real security experiment ExpConPAKS,A(κ). The
oracles Chcon(·, ·, ·), Reg(·), Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·)
are answered as follows.
• Chcon(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w0, ix∗), the simulator aborts
if ((i∗ ≥ 0) ∨ (i ≥ j)). Otherwise, it sets i∗ ← i and
invokes oracle Out(i∗, w0, ix∗).
• Reg(·): on input d ∈ {0, 1} the simulator randomly
selects fresh pi $← D and K $← G, and initializes an
empty database Cd,j . Then, the simulator and A execute
the Register protocol, where the simulator plays the
roles of U and Sd, and interacts with A that plays the role
of S1-d. The simulator then sends j toA as a session iden-
tifier. Finally, it records τ [j] ← (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d),
infod ← (S1-d, xd, gr1 , gr2 , Cpi,Kd, mkd), increments
j ← j + 1, and stores variables r2 and x1-d for later
use in the proof.
• Out(·, ·, ·): on input (i, w, ix), it aborts if (i ≥ j);
otherwise, it obtains (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d)← τ [i]. Then,
it sets Set← Set∪ (i, w, ix). The simulator and A then
execute the Outsource protocol, where the simulator
plays the roles of U and Sd, and interacts with A that
plays the role of S1-d.
• Ret(·, ·): on input (i, w), it aborts if (i ≥ j); or otherwise,
it obtains parameters (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d) ← τ [i]. The
simulator and A then execute the Retrieve protocol
where the simulator plays the roles of U and Sd, and
interacts with A that plays the role of S1-d.
• RetS(·): on input i, the simulator aborts if (i ≥ j); other-
wise, it obtains parameters (d, pi, infod, r2, x1-d)← τ [i]
and executes RetrieveSd(par, U, infod).
Lemma 16: AdvConPAKS,A(κ) = Pr[succCon0 ]
Experiment ExpCon1 . This experiment is similar to ExpCon0
except that the value yd is ensured to be fresh in every session
executed by the simulator through the oracles Out(·, ·, ·),
Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·).
Lemma 17: Pr[succCon0 ] = Pr[succCon1 ]
Experiment ExpCon2 . This experiment is similar to ExpCon1
except that the simulator aborts if a value for Y repeats in two
different sessions of the protocol executed by the simulator
through oracles Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·).
1) By the perfect hiding of Pedersen commitments, values
of Y1-d are guaranteed to be independent from Yd
because the adversary acquires nothing from cd.
2) Because of the binding property of Pedersen commit-
ments, which is based on the hardness of the DL
problem, it is hard to open c1-d to a different value
Y ′1-d 6= Y1-d.
Since Y1-d is guaranteed to be independent from Yd and Yd
is fresh, this implies that the freshness of Y is based on the
hardness of the DL problem.
Lemma 18: |Pr[succCon1 ]− Pr[succCon2 ]| ≤ AdvDLA (κ)
Experiment ExpCon3 . This experiment is similar to ExpCon2
except that in oracles Out(·, ·, ·), Ret(·, ·) and RetS(·), the
message (Zd, µd) from the honest server Sd to the user
is replaced with (E,µ′d) where E
$← G and µ′d ←
Tag(mkd, A, Y,E). We discuss the following two cases:
1) For the oracles Out(·, ·, ·) and Ret(·, ·), let (g, gα, gβ , Q)
be an instance of the DDH problem, the simulator aims
to output 1 if Q = gαβ ; or 0 otherwise. The simulator
sets A← gαhpi , Yd ← gβ , Rd ← (gβ)r2 and
Zd ← Kd(gβ)r2(x0+x1)Q-1(gr1 · (gβ)r2 ·R1-d)-xd
If Q = gαβ , this experiment is identical to ExpCon2 ;
otherwise, identical to ExpCon3 . The hardness of the DDH
problem thus implies the indistinguishability of ExpCon2
from ExpCon3 .
2) For oracle RetS(·), assume pi′ is the password
tried by A, the key K (in ExpCon2 ) is equal to
Z0Z1Y
ah(pi−pi
′)(y0+y1); under the DDH assumption, the
adversary cannot distinguish h(pi−pi
′)(y0+y1) (in ExpCon2 )
from a random number in G (in ExpCon3 ) unless pi′ = pi
which denotes a successful on-line dictionary attack. By
the uniform distribution of passwords, its probability is
estimated as qs ·AdvDDHA (κ) + qs|D| .
Lemma 19: |Pr[succCon2 ] − Pr[succCon3 ]| ≤ (qs +
1)AdvDDHA (κ) +
qs
|D|
Experiment ExpCon4 . This experiment is similar to ExpCon3 ex-
cept that in each session i, values for mku ← KDF1(K, U, ‘0’),
mkd ← KDF1(K, Sd, ‘1’), mk1-d ← KDF1(K, S1-d, ‘1’) are
replaced with mku ← F1(i, U, ‘0’), mkd ← F1(i, Sd, ‘1’)
and mk1-d ← F1(i, S1-d, ‘1’), respectively. An empty table
T1 is initialized in the beginning of ExpCon4 . The function
F1(i, id, k) returns mk if ∃(i, id, k, mk) ∈ T1; otherwise, it
picks a fresh mk $← KMAC, stores (i, id, k, mk) in T1, and returns
mk← F1(i, id, k). Since the adversary only obtains mk1-d, by
the uniform distribution of K and the security of KDF1, we
obtain
Lemma 20: |Pr[succCon3 ]− Pr[succCon4 ]| ≤ qr ·AdvKDFA (κ)
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Experiment ExpCon5 . Let C0 = (e0, v0, µc) be the ciphertext
that has been outsourced in response to the query of A
to the oracle Chcon(·, ·, ·) on input (i, w0, ix∗). Note that
v0 = PRF(t0, e0) where t0 ← KDF2(K,w0). This experiment
is similar to ExpCon4 except that while processing Ret(i
∗, w1)
on behalf of honest U and Sd the simulator aborts if t0 ←
KDF2(K,w1). In this case we obtain a KDF2 collision, i.e.
KDF2(K,w0) = KDF2(K,w1) for w0 6= w1, and hence
Lemma 21: |Pr[succCon4 ]− Pr[succCon5 ]| ≤ qo ·AdvKDFA (κ)
Experiment ExpCon6 . This experiment is similar to ExpCon5
except that while processing Ret(i∗, w1) on behalf of honest
U and Sd the simulator aborts if v0 = PRF(t1, e0) for some
t1 ← KDF2(K,w1). In this case we obtain a PRF collision, i.e.
PRF(t0, e0) = PRF(t1, e0) for t0 6= t1, and hence
Lemma 22: |Pr[succCon5 ]− Pr[succCon6 ]| ≤ qo ·AdvPRFA (κ)
ExpCon6 ensures that the original ciphertext C0 = (e0, v0, µc)
that has been outsourced in response to the query (i, w0, ix∗)
will never pass the verification performed by honest U and
Sd. Hence, in order to win in ExpCon6 the adversary needs to
come up with C∗ = (e∗, v∗, µ∗c) where v
∗ = PRF(t1, e∗) for
t1 ← KDF2(K,w1) and µ∗c is a valid authentication tag on the
message (e∗, v∗, ix∗), which would constitute a MAC forgery.
Assuming that MAC is unforgeable, we conclude
Lemma 23: Pr[succCon6 ] = AdvMACA (κ)
As a result, based on Lemmas 16 to 23, our PAKS construction
offers consistency based on the assumed hardness of the DL,
DDH problems and the security of KDF1, KDF2, PRF and MAC.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced Password Authenticated Keyword Search
(PAKS) as a new concept where search over encrypted key-
words can be performed solely with the help of a human-
memorizable password. In comparison to earlier formats of
searchable encryption the use of passwords simplifies key
management and by removing the need for storing and man-
aging high-entropy keys on the user side makes the whole
process device-agnostic. The use of passwords introduces
however new challenges to the design of PAKS protocols; in
particular, creating the need for a distributed server architec-
ture to achieve security against offline dictionary attacks.
In this paper we modeled the functionality and security
properties of PAKS, incl. IND-CKA-security for keyword pri-
vacy, authentication for outsourcing, and consistency for the
search procedure, and proposed a direct PAKS construction
those security and privacy has been proven under standard
assumptions. Our direct PAKS construction is an optimised
version of a more general concept for building PAKS protocols
based on techniques underlying password-authenticated secret
sharing and symmetric searchable encryption. The proposed
PAKS scheme is practical and offers high performance in
relation to computations and communications on the user side.
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